信息不对称性与风险企业相机控制权安排的关系分析

相机控制权安排是风险投资合约的中心问题之一。在风险资本融资时,存在信息不对称和逆向选择问题。创业家向风险资本家转移的控制权是显示其类型的信号,这是一个不完全信息动态博弈问题。拥有相机控制权的风险资本家会根据事后的信息决定是否对风险企业进行干预。如果进行干预,创业家得不到私人利益。因此,风险资本家拥有相机控制权,对好创业家来说,成本是很低的,对坏创业家而言,是很大的威胁,从而使好创业家得到融资的同时,减少了坏创业家进行融资的可能性。

An Analysis on the Relationship Between Asymmetric Information and Contingent Control Power in VC-backed Firms

The contingent control power arrangement is one of the central issues in VC contracts. In VC financing, there is a problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection. In order to signal his type, the EN often transfers some control power to the VCs. This is an incomplete information dynamic game. The VCs with contingent control power will decide whether to interfere with the VC - backed firms according to the ex - post information, which may destroy the private value of the EN under interfereuce. Hence, it is cheap to a good EN, but is a threat to a bad EN. The contingent control power arrangement prevents a bad EN from financing while a good EN being financed.