Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents |
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Authors: | Gautam Bose |
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Affiliation: | (1) School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, AUSTRALIA (e-mail: g.bose@unsw.edu.au) , AU |
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Abstract: | Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving. Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California. |
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Keywords: | and Phrases:Market segmentation Intermediation Heterogeneous agents. |
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