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科技扶贫过程中利益相关主体的博弈分析
引用本文:许佳贤,谢志忠,苏时鹏,黄安胜.科技扶贫过程中利益相关主体的博弈分析[J].湖南经济管理干部学院学报,2011(4):68-70,77.
作者姓名:许佳贤  谢志忠  苏时鹏  黄安胜
作者单位:[1]福建农林大学人文社会科学学院,福建福州350002 [2]福建农林大学经济管理学院,福建福州350002
基金项目:福建省软科学重点项目“福建科技扶贫整村推进机制与政策研究”(编号:2008R0102);福建省软科学重点项目.“环境优化型科技扶贫机制创新研究”(编号:2010R0025).
摘    要:建立由政府、驻村科技人员以及扶贫客体(贫困农户和村委会)组成的三方博弈模型分析科技扶贫过程中涉及的相关利益主体的行为动机。结果表明扶贫效果与贫困主体自身投入的要素资源量成反比,与政府投入的扶贫资源量以及驻村科技人员的努力程度成正比。

关 键 词:科技扶贫  利益相关主体  三方博弈

Game Analysis of Stakeholders in Poverty Relieving by Science and Technology
XU Jia-xian,XIE Zhi-zhong,SU Shi-peng,HUANG An-sheng.Game Analysis of Stakeholders in Poverty Relieving by Science and Technology[J].Journal of Hunan Economic Management College,2011(4):68-70,77.
Authors:XU Jia-xian  XIE Zhi-zhong  SU Shi-peng  HUANG An-sheng
Institution:(a. Humanities and Social Sciences College; b. Economies and Management College, Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002, Fujian, China)
Abstract:Based on the motives of the stakeholders during the process of poverty relieving by science and technology, the study builds the tripartite game formed by government, village--based technology as well as the object of supporting the poor (poor farmers and village com- mittees), which shows that the effect of poverty relieving is inverse to the poor's own investment, and direct ratio to the resource that government invested and the effort degree of scientific and technological persons staying in the villages.
Keywords:poverty relieving by science and technology  stakeholders  tripartite game
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