合谋视角下的农民合作社绩效与评级

本文首先构建了一个中央政府作为委托人、地方政府作为监管者、合作社作为代理人的动态博弈的理论框架,然后基于对农民合作社的微观调查数据建立Logit和Probit模型,分析政社合谋与合作社绩效对农民合作社评级的影响。研究结果表明,具有合谋特征的合作社更容易获得合作社评级;地方政府越看重政治利益,合作社获得评级的概率越低;合作社绩效对获得评级没有显著性影响。

Performance and Rating of Farmers' Cooperatives from the Perspective of Collusion

As an important agricultural operating entity,farmer cooperatives play an important role in the rural development and revitalization,and the rating of farmers’ cooperatives is an important means to regulate and promote the healthy development of them.This paper first constructs a theoretical framework of the dynamic game among the central government,the local government and the cooperative,in which the central government is the principal,the local government is the regulators,and the cooperative is the agent.Then it establishes the Logit and Probit models based on the micro-survey data of farmers’ cooperatives to analyze how political and social collusion and cooperative performance affect the rating of farmer cooperatives.The results show that farmers’ cooperatives with collusive characteristics can get ratings.When the local governments focus on political interests,farmers’ cooperatives find it difficult to get ratings.The performance of farmers’ cooperatives has no significant impact on the rating.This study has theoretical and practical significance for the central government to improve the cooperative rating methods and related policies,and promote the standardized development of cooperatives.