Strategic Complementarity in Direct Investments |
| |
Authors: | Toshihiro Matsumura |
| |
Institution: | Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo, Japan |
| |
Abstract: | The paper investigates a three‐country duopoly model. Two developed countries have large markets and one developing country has a cost advantage. The author finds that strategic complementarity in location choice yields multiple equilibria. One is a cost‐oriented agglomeration of firms in the developing country and the other is a market‐oriented equilibrium where each firm locates in its developed home country. Also, private incentives for the cost‐oriented location are excessive (resp. insufficient) from the viewpoint of world welfare if firms choose their locations non‐cooperatively (resp. cooperatively). |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|