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产品质量、议价能力与通道费
引用本文:李陈华 王庚. 产品质量、议价能力与通道费[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2019, 39(11): 5-17
作者姓名:李陈华 王庚
作者单位:南京审计大学 经济学院
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目;“江苏省重点序列学科—应用经济学”
摘    要:零售商通道费的产生机理和福利效应是理论界研究的热点,而零售商现有货架上的在售商品对潜在厂商交易条件的影响却少有研究。文章在货架稀缺的视角下,以包含产品质量的经典效用函数为起点,基于现实中零售商普遍采用的预付费合约和相应商务谈判过程的实际,建立了量化零售商产品质量和议价能力的渠道博弈模型,考察了通道费的产生条件、作用机制和福利效果,并探讨了预付费合约本身的现实基础和例外情况。结果表明:当预付费模式是一种刚性的制度安排时,通道费是否产生取决于零售商的议价能力和现有产品质量,只有议价能力和产品质量都很低的零售商才无法收取通道费;当零售商有能力在预付费模式和买断模式之间选择时,预付费一定实现为通道费,代理费必然不会产生。对生产商而言,通道费迫使低质量厂商退出市场,客观上起到了产品质量筛选的作用。这一筛选机制也决定了消费者福利的损益。

关 键 词:产品质量  议价能力  合约选择  质量筛选  消费者福利  
收稿时间:2019-05-21

Product Quality,Bargaining Power and Slotting Allowances
LI Chenhua WANG Geng. Product Quality,Bargaining Power and Slotting Allowances[J]. Business Economics and Administration, 2019, 39(11): 5-17
Authors:LI Chenhua WANG Geng
Affiliation:School of Economics,Nanjing Audit University
Abstract:The formation mechanism and welfare effects of slotting allowances is still a hot topic in academia. However, there is little study on the effects of retailers’ commodity quality towards transaction terms between market participants. Based on the reality of business negotiations between retailers and suppliers and a classical utility function, this paper has established an upfront payment model which contains product qualities and bargaining power and investigate the formation and operation mechanisms as well as market effects of slotting allowances. In addition, this paper also analyzes the practical basis of the upfront payment model and investigates some exceptional cases. The result shows that, when the upfront payment is a rigid contract arrangement, the formation of slotting allowances depends on retailers’ product quality and bargaining power simultaneously, and only retailers with low product quality and low bargaining power cannot charge fees. If retailers make decisions on contract structures and choose upfront payment contracts finally, slotting allowances will be the only outcome in equilibrium. For manufacturers, slotting allowances can be a quality screen mechanism by force for the low quality firms to exit. This screen mechanism also determines the gains and losses of consumers’ surplus under slotting allowances.
Keywords:product quality  bargaining power  contract arrangement  screen mechanism  consumer welfare  
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