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零售商抗衡势力假说研究评述
引用本文:胡春燕. 零售商抗衡势力假说研究评述[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2010, 1(5): 18-23
作者姓名:胡春燕
作者单位:上海师范大学金融学院
摘    要:文章以纵向市场结构为背景对零售商买方势力进行了较为清晰的界定,并依据买方势力的福利影响区分买方垄断势力和买方抗衡势力。然后从理论模型、经验研究和实验设计等方面,系统综述了零售商抗衡势力的测度方法及其对市场价格、市场绩效和社会福利影响的相关研究进展,以此对我国零售业实施相关的规制政策提供一定的理论指导和经验借鉴。

关 键 词:抗衡势力假说  大型零售商  买方势力  
收稿时间:2009-11-16

Review for Mega-retailers Countervailing Power Hypothesis
HU Chun-yan. Review for Mega-retailers Countervailing Power Hypothesis[J]. Business Economics and Administration, 2010, 1(5): 18-23
Authors:HU Chun-yan
Affiliation:HU Chun-yan(College of Finance,Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)
Abstract:This paper defines buyer power of Mega-retailers in the context of vertical market structure and distinguishes monopsony from Countervailing Power based on social welfare.Then the paper makes a survey of theoretical and empirical literature on countervailing power,focusing on the estimate method and the impact on market price,market performance of industrial channel and social welfare.The conclusions provide some instructions and experience for implementing regulation policies of retailing industry in China...
Keywords:countervailing power  mega-retailers  buyer power  
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