论LLSV法律来源论的缺陷性

拉普特等人用数据来表明,法律来源于普通法系国家比法律来源于大陆法系国家特别是法国大陆法系国家能更好地保护投资者,而德国大陆法系国家和斯堪的纳维亚国家则介于这二者之间。公司所有权的集中程度在他们的研究中被认为是对投资者保护差的一种适应性反映。在本文,我们用中国和其他国家的证据来说明政治经济因素比法律来源论能更好地解释在中国的转型经济中对小股东保护差的原因。我们认为中国上市公司所有权非常集中的原因是政府决策的直接结果,也认为政府控制绝大部分上市公司在某种程度上减弱了对小股东的保护。

Problems with LLSV''''s Legal Origin Theory

Using a sample of 49 countries,La Porta et al.show that countries whose legal rules originate in the common-law tradition tend to protect investors considerably more than the countries whose legal rules originate in the civil-law,and especially the French-civil-law tradition,with the German-civil-law and the Scandinavian countries taking an intermediate stance toward investor protections.Ownership concentration in their research is treated as an adaptive response to poor investor protection.In this article,we use evidence from China and other places to demonstrate that the political economy is more important than the legal origin in explaining the weak protection of minority shareholders in China's transitional economy.We argue that the ownership concentration of the state in China's listed companies is a direct result of the government's political goal of controlling most of the listed companies.We further show that the political goal of maintaining control of most of the listed companies by the government weakens the protection of minority shareholders in China.