The socialist labor-managed firm and bank-financed investment: Some theoretical issues |
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Authors: | Eirik G Furubotn |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843 USA |
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Abstract: | Under a labor-managed system of the Yugoslav type of 1965–1971, the process of capital formation is subject to special difficulties, linked to the structure of property rights. Workers possess neither permanent nor transferable claims on capital assets but are, nevertheless, required by law to maintain the value of the firm's initial capital stock and of any additions to it. The law is intended to protect the nation's capital stock but is ill designed for this purpose. Its immediate effect is to reduce the collective's willingness to undertake bank-financed investment, and thus it promotes inefficient intertemporal allocation. |
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