Collectives,communes, and incentives |
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Authors: | L Dwight Israelseni |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602 USA |
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Abstract: | A model of individual-worker incentives in alternative economic organizations—collective, communal, capitalist—is developed. It is demonstrated that, ceteris paribus, incentives are much higher in collectives than in communes, and are likely higher in collectives than in comparable capitalist organizations. The effect on incentives of changes in prices, rent, and organization size is examined, and it is shown that individual incentives in a collective increase with the scale of the organization. The impact of various parameters on hours worked is examined in the framework of utility maximization. The results are compared to those of Domar, Ward, and Vanek. |
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