Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Science, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China;2. Institute of Modeling and Algorithm, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China;3. Department of Statistics and Finance, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;1. School of Mathematics and Physics, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou Gansu 730070, China;2. Department of Basic Science, Faculty of Computers and Informatics, Suez Canal University, Ismailia 41522, Egypt;3. School of Law, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018, China;4. Research Centre of Game theory and Economics Mathematics, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou Gansu 730070, China;5. Department of Mathematics, College of Science and Humanities in Al-Kharj, Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University, Al-Kharj 11942, Saudi Arabia;1. Institute of Industrial Organization and Regulation, Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, PR China;2. Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, PR China;3. SinoAsia Economic and Management Foundation, Taiwan;1. Department of Statistics and Operations Researches, College of Science, King Saud University, P.O. Box 2455, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia;2. Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Mansoura University, Mansoura 35516, Egypt |
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| Abstract: | The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process. |
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