Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption,impunity and cover-up |
| |
Authors: | Javier Núñez |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Universidad de Chile, Diagonal Paraguay 257, Santiago, Chile |
| |
Abstract: | This paper analyzes the reputation-based incentives of a Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) to detect and expose consumer fraud committed by its members, and the members’ incentives to bribe the SRO in exchange for a cover-up to avoid an external punishment. In a corruption-free benchmark, SROs are effective in detecting, exposing and deterring fraud only if exposure yields a reputation gain to the SRO, which depends on consumers inferences about the SRO’s type. However, if this case prevails the member can succeed in bribing the SRO in exchange for a cover-up and impunity. Despite this, a bribed SRO yields more vigilance and lower fraud than no self-regulation at all. |
| |
Keywords: | Self-Regulation Fraud Corruption Bribery |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|