An Interpretation of the Collapsing Process of the Bretton Woods System |
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Authors: | Chih-huan Chen Ching-chong Lai |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, Feng-Chia University, Taichung, 407, Taiwan;(2) Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, 115, Taiwan;(3) Department of Economics, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, 116, Taiwan |
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Abstract: | This paper attempts to determine the environments that market confidence might play a significant role in the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. We build a game-theoretic model of currency crises where a continuum of small speculators can decide their market confidence and trading positions. In the model, the convertibility of dollar is assumed to exhibit a long-term downtrend due to Triffin’s dilemma. The problem is analyzed on the grounds of both certainty and uncertainty. In the certainty case, we find that if the convertibility of dollar is low enough, a dollar crisis is inevitable, but if the convertibility is in an intermediate range with multiple equilibria, the Bretton Woods system is vulnerable to self-fulfilling speculation. In the uncertainty case, the incidence of the confidence crises will disproportionately increase as the convertibility of dollar falls. Lastly, this paper shows that the Federal Reserve Bank’s secrecy may extend the maximum lifespan of the Bretton Woods system. |
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