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对外贸易中行业自律定价行为的博弈分析
引用本文:赵玉,祁春节. 对外贸易中行业自律定价行为的博弈分析[J]. 商业研究, 2008, 0(3): 18-21
作者姓名:赵玉  祁春节
作者单位:华中农业大学经济管理学院,湖北,武汉,430070
基金项目:教育部跨世纪优秀人才培养计划
摘    要:当前我国经济生活中存在的一个突出的现象是价格战与行业自律定价并存。从中国参与出口的同质企业所结成的价格卡特尔表明:出口企业追求利润最大化行为的结果必然陷入"囚徒困境",表现为价格大战;在没有外在强制力量时,企业尽管可以相互依存,仍然走不出困境;如果惩罚条款这一承诺行动可以置信,则出现合作均衡;优势企业也可促使合作均衡的出现。

关 键 词:对外贸易  价格卡特尔  博弈分析  行业自律定价
文章编号:1001-148X(2008)03-0018-03
修稿时间:2007-04-05

Game Analysis on Line Self-reliance Pricing in Foreign Trade
ZAHO Yu,QI Chun-jie. Game Analysis on Line Self-reliance Pricing in Foreign Trade[J]. Commercial Research, 2008, 0(3): 18-21
Authors:ZAHO Yu  QI Chun-jie
Abstract:At present there is a prominent phenomenon in Chinese national economic activities that price war and Cartel pricing coexist.This paper takes the Cartel pricing on the export of enterprise in China for example,analyses the gaming behavior of export enterprises of citrus with the game theory.It has been found that the inevitable result which export enterprises seek maximum profit is prisoner's dilemma and shows price war;though the export enterprises may depend on each other and they can not break off dilemma when there is not external forced strength;if punishment clause is credible commitment,Nash equilibrium would appear;the preponderant enterprises would impel cooperation equilibrium.
Keywords:foreign trade  price cartel  game analysis  line self-reliance pricing
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