Are “Anti-Folk Theorems” in repeated games nongeneric? |
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| Authors: | Roger Lagunoff Akihiko Matsui |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057 USA. (e-mail: lagunofr@gunet.georgetown.edu; www.georgetown.edu/lagunoff/lagunoff.htm) , US;(2) Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan , JP;(3) Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, University of Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan (e-mail: amatsui@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp) , JP |
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| Abstract: | Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these
results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that
when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed discount factor close to one there is an open neighborhood of games which contains
a pure coordination game such that every Perfect equilibrium of every game in the neighborhood approximates to an arbitrary
degree the unique Pareto dominant payoff of the pure coordination game. |
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