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消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机
引用本文:张耀辉 燕波. 消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机[J]. 中国工业经济, 2007, 0(12): 22-29
作者姓名:张耀辉 燕波
作者单位:暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“基于企业家创新的产业演化理论与实证研究”(批准号0573041).
摘    要:消费契约具有长期契约特征,不但企业对消费者的购买激励具备投资特征,消费者也会在购买过程中形成专用性资产。通过转移成本壁垒,企业和消费者被封闭在一种双边的长期契约关系当中,这种关系造成了消费契约的相对稳定性。但同时由于契约的不完全性,一旦消费者预期专用性资产变为沉没成本,潜在消费者将转投其他企业,造成企业的迅速倒闭。如果大企业不能采取有效措施,小的失误可能会演变成大的危机;由于大企业存在着危机的外部性.因此需要相应的公共政策。

关 键 词:消费契约 专用性资产 转移成本 消费者预期
文章编号:1006-480X(2007)12-0022-08
收稿时间:2007-11-10

Two Characteristics of Consumer Contracts and Crisis of Big Enterprise
ZHANG Yao-hui, YAN Bo. Two Characteristics of Consumer Contracts and Crisis of Big Enterprise[J]. China Industrial Economy, 2007, 0(12): 22-29
Authors:ZHANG Yao-hui   YAN Bo
Abstract:The consumer contract has some characteristics like the long-term contract.Because not only do the firms invest to promote incentive for consumers to buy,but also consumers form specific assets during the purchase.Then firms and consumers are closed in the relationship of the long-term contracts because of switching cost barriers,which makes the consumer contract relatively stable.However,since the incompleteness of contract,once customers anticipate their specific assets turn into sunk costs,the potential consumers would switch to investing in other firms,resulting in the rapid collapse of the former enterprise.If the big enterprises can't take the effective measures,the little effect can turned into a great crisis,and there is externality of the crisis in the big enterprise,the public policy is a must.
Keywords:consumer contract    specific assets    switching costs    expectation of consumers
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