Temporary contracts and employee effort |
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| Affiliation: | 1. PSE, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France;2. IZA, Bonn, Germany;3. Banque de France, 31 rue Croix des Petits-Champs, 75001 Paris, France;1. Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg and Labor and Socio-Economic Research Center (LASER) Nuremberg. Lange Gasse 20, Nuremberg D-90403, Germany;2. Martin-Luther University Halle-Wittenberg and Labor and Socio-Economic Research Center (LASER) Nuremberg. Große Steinstraße 73, Halle (Saale) D-06108, Germany;1. Copenhagen Business School and IZA, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16A, Frederiksberg 2000, Denmark;2. Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal, CIRANO and IZA, C.P. 8888, Succ. centre ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3P8, Canada;1. Department of Economics and Management, University of Padua, Italy;2. Netspar, Tilburg, The Netherlands;3. Department of Economics, Ca'' Foscari University Venice, Italy;1. Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, United States;2. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Hoover Institution, IZA and CEPR, United States |
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| Abstract: | Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide “stepping stones” into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons, workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS), we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60%. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of endogenous selection into temporary employment. |
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