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Core convergence with asymmetric information

Institution:	1. Rutgers University, USA;2. University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA;1. Department of Economics, London Business School, United Kingdom;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, United Kingdom;3. GSEM Geneva, Switzerland;1. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET. Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700 San Luis, Argentina;2. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Departament d''Economía i Història Econòmica, Edifici B, UAB, 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;1. Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;2. Keio University, Department of Economics, 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, Japan

Abstract:	We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economies. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow–Debreu economy.

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