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国有企业产权制度变革过程的政治经济学分析
引用本文:钟玉文. 国有企业产权制度变革过程的政治经济学分析[J]. 财贸研究, 2010, 21(4): 8-15
作者姓名:钟玉文
作者单位:合肥师范学院,经济系,安徽,合肥,230601
摘    要:国有企业产权制度是由最高(政治)决策者的利益决定的,但当就业压力、经济增长压力不断增大,制度的边际报酬趋于递减,以致不利于最高(政治)决策者维护政权稳定之时,改革必然会启动。在有限理性的局限下,为了保证政权的稳定,国家必然不可能进行一次性的彻底改革。但是在外部竞争压力和企业内部人对国家利益的侵蚀下,非彻底的改革导致原有产权制度下的风险不断增加,当这些事后的风险危及到国家目标的实现时,国家将不得不推进改革,这是改革得以持续推进的基本动力。

关 键 词:最高(政治)决策者  产权制度  事后风险  国有企业改革

Political Economic Analysis on Reformation Procession of Property Rights of State-owned Enterprises
ZHONG Yu-wen. Political Economic Analysis on Reformation Procession of Property Rights of State-owned Enterprises[J]. Finance and Trade Research, 2010, 21(4): 8-15
Authors:ZHONG Yu-wen
Affiliation:ZHONG Yu-wen(Economics Department,Hefei Normal University,Hefei 230601)
Abstract:The institutional arrangements of Property rights of state-owned enterprises are decided by HPD's interests. With the increasing pressure of employment and the economic growth and the diminishing marginal returns of institutions damaging the domination of HPD,reform is necessary. Under the limitations of the limited rationality the governor mustn't make a one-time radical reform for ensuring state power steady. Under the pressure of external competition and the insider's erosion of the state's claim rights,...
Keywords:highest (politics) decision-makers  property rights system  the ex post facto risk  reform of state-owned enterprises  
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