Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Amparo?UrbanoEmail author Jose?E?Vila |
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Institution: | (1) Departamento de Análisis Económico, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Campus de los Naranjos, Edificio departamental oriental, 46022 Valencia, SPAIN |
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Abstract: | Summary. We show the role of unmediated talk with computational complexity bounds as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player games with incomplete information and rational parameters. We prove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be reached as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a two phase universal mechanism of interim computationally restricted pre-play communication. The communication protocols are designed with the help of modern cryptographic tools. A familiar context in which our results could be applied is bilateral trading with incomplete information.Received: 9 September 2002, Revised: 14 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72. Correspondence to: Amparo UrbanoWe wish to thank financial aid from the Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE) and partial support by DIGCYT under project PB95 - 1074. A previous version of this work appears as IVIE Working Paper WP-AD 99-07, under the title: "Unmediated talk under incomplete information". |
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Keywords: | Computational complexity Unmediated communication Correlated equilibrium Bayesian-Nash equilibrium |
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