| 环境污染的预防与环境管制的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄文平.环境污染的预防与环境管制的博弈分析[J].湖北经济学院学报,2011,9(4):91-96. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄文平 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江财经学院东方学院金融与经贸分院,浙江海宁,314408 |
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| 基金项目： | 浙江财经学院东方学院重大课题 |
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| 摘 要： | 随着工业化和城镇化的快速推进,我国的环境污染问题日益严重。环境污染管制是政府社会性管制的重要组成部分,本文从经济学的角度出发,分析了不同污染类型下的地方政府在环境管制政策上的合作态度所导致的社会福利的差别、在管制进程中不同利益主体之间在管制冲突时讨价还价及其影响因素,为提高我国环境管制的效率,保障环境质量以及维护社会稳定等方面提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 环境污染 环境管制 讨价还价 预防 |
Environmental Pollution Prevention and the Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation |
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| HUANG Wen-ping.Environmental Pollution Prevention and the Game Analysis of Environmental Regulation[J].Journal of Hubei University of Economics,2011,9(4):91-96. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Wen-ping |
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| Institution: | HUANG Wen-ping(Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics Dongfang College,Haining Zhejiang 314408,China) |
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| Abstract: | Environmental pollution control is the government is an important part of the social regulation.With the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization,Chinese environmental pollution problem is getting worse.From the perspective of economics,thi |
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| Keywords: | environmental pollution environment control bargaining prevention |
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