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Long-run selection and the work ethic
Authors:Jens Josephson  Karl Wrneryd
Institution:aDepartment of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Fargas 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain;bCentre de Referència d'Economia Analítica (CREA), Spain;cDepartment of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden;dCESifo, Germany
Abstract:That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Applying stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.
Keywords:Work ethic  Evolution  Public goods  Stochastic dynamics
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