论所有权结构的治理功能--关于国有企业所有权结构的设计

本文提出了一种所有权结构的理论,将激励和监督统一在一个所有权结构模型中,其中,激励因素决定了企业的可实现收入,监督因素制定则决定了管理者对收入的转移量。利用这一理论对国有企业改革中的两个主要阶段－－承包制和公司制进行了分析。由于国有资产（或国家股）不存在明确的利益主体,因此,它在企业中也不适合作为监督主体而存在,为使国有资产实现保值和增值的目的,可行的办法是让其“搭便车”,也就是对国有企业的所有权结构进行重组,通过引进监督实体来优化企业的所有权结构和治理结构。股份制对于国有企业提高效率是必须的,但不是充分的。只有借股份制的契机,优化国有企业的所有权结构才是可行和有效的。

On the governance Function of Ownership Structure

This paper advances a theory on ownership structure, combining the two factors of incentive and monitor into one ownership structure model, the former factor determining the realizable income while the latter determining the manager's income transfer amount. The paper makes an analysis, with the theory, on the main stages-contraction system and incorporation system, during our state-owned enterprise reform. The analysis points out that the state-owned assets ( or state-held shares) are not able to be a main player in monitor since there is no clear beneficiary. In order to realize the hedge and increment of state assets, the feasible way is to let them "freerider", that is, to reconstracture the ownership structure of state-owned enterprises by introducing supervisory entity to optimize it. The joint-stock system is necessary but not sufficient to raise the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises. It will be feasible and effective only to optimize the ownership structure by taking advantage of the joint stock system.