| 审计合谋的动态博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐慧.审计合谋的动态博弈分析[J].时代经贸,2007,5(4X):40-42. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东培正学院,广东广州 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过建立完全信息动态博弈模型，分析了CPA与管理者之间如何确定审计收费以及形成合谋的条件。通过寻找打破合谋的条件，提出了加强监管力度、改善审计收费自律机制等建议，以阻止CPA与管理者从虚假财务信息中获利。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 合谋 审计收费 审计独立性 |
Analysis of exteusive game model for auditing collusions |
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| XU Hui.Analysis of exteusive game model for auditing collusions[J].Economic & Trade Update,2007,5(4X):40-42. |
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| Authors: | XU Hui |
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| Institution: | Guangdong Peizheng College, Guangzhou Guangdong |
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| Abstract: | An extensive game model with complete information is developed in this paper to analyze how CPA and manager determine audit fees, and the conditions under which the collusions between CPA and manager are formed. Some suggestions, such as strengthening regulation and improving self - discipline of the audit fees etc. , to forbid these two parts to profit from the pseudo financial information are presented through finding measures to break the collusions. |
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| Keywords: | Game theory Cahoots Audit fees Audit independence |
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