Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation |
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| Authors: | B. Hehenkamp W. Leininger A. Possajennikov |
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| Affiliation: | a Department of Economics, University of Dortmund, 44221, Dortmund, Germany;b School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK |
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| Abstract: | Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent. |
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| Keywords: | Contests Evolutionary stable strategy Spite Overdissipation |
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