| 资本市场流动性与股东积极主义的扩展式博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 姚靠华,洪昀. 资本市场流动性与股东积极主义的扩展式博弈研究[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2009, 30(1) |
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| 作者姓名： | 姚靠华 洪昀 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南大学,会计学院,湖南,长沙,410079;湖南大学,会计学院,湖南,长沙,410079 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过应用扩展式博弈分析方法,研究市场流动性与股东积极主义之间的关系,并探讨不同股东积极主义形式问的选择.研究发现:市场流动性与股东积极性之间并不存在简单的线性关系.而在不同的股东积极主义形式的选取上,单位成功几率成本低的股东积极主义形式更有可能被大股东所采用,但市场流动性的提高会减弱大股东对单位成功几率成本低的策略的偏好.
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| 关 键 词： | 流动性 股东积极主义 扩展式博弈 |
The Research of Capital Market Liquidity and Shareholder Activism Based on the Extend Game Theory |
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| YAO Kao-hu,HONG Yun. The Research of Capital Market Liquidity and Shareholder Activism Based on the Extend Game Theory[J]. The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics, 2009, 30(1) |
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| Authors: | YAO Kao-hu HONG Yun |
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| Affiliation: | Accounting College;Hunan University;Changsha;Hunan 410079;China |
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the relationship of liquidity and shareholder's activism and the selection of different types of shareholder's activism by using the extend game theory.It is founded that there is no simple monotonic relationship between liquidity and shareholder's activism.As to different shareholder activism styles,large shareholders prefer the strategy with low cost of per unit success probability.However,this preference of the large shareholders can be stopped by increase of liquidity. |
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| Keywords: | Liquidity Shareholder Activism The Extend Game Theory |
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