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中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析
引用本文:刘海洋,周明月. 中国产品质量监管的声誉模型分析[J]. 经济与管理, 2009, 23(4): 29-31
作者姓名:刘海洋  周明月
作者单位:中国人民大学,经济学院,北京,100872;中国人民大学,经济学院,北京,100872
摘    要:当前中国商品市场上假冒伪劣现象严重,损害消费者权益的事件层出不穷.在两阶段声誉模型中,消费者运用贝叶斯法则推断企业诚信状况并决定下期的购买行为,此时声誉力量可以约束企业的投机主义倾向,将造假企业驱逐出市场.而对重点行业加强监管、加大处罚力度、鼓励消费者投诉,可以促进市场净化,加快诚信社会的建设步伐.

关 键 词:产品质量  声誉模型  博弈  监管

A Reputation Model Analysis on the Supervision of Product Quality in China
Liu Haiyang,Zhou Mingyue. A Reputation Model Analysis on the Supervision of Product Quality in China[J]. Economy and Management, 2009, 23(4): 29-31
Authors:Liu Haiyang  Zhou Mingyue
Affiliation:School of Economics;Renmin University of China;Beijing 100872;China
Abstract:There are too many shoddy products filling Chinese commodity markets,which seriously damaged the interests of consumers.In the reputation model,consumers use Bayesian law to judge the integrity of corporations,and decide the purchase behavior of next phase.As the result,reputation can serve as a power to restraint opportunism of firms,driving the counterfeiting firm out the market.Enforcing the regulation on key industries,increasing the penalties and encouraging consumers to complaint can quicken the build...
Keywords:product quality  reputation  game theory  supervision  
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