Incentives to innovate in response to competition: The role of agency costs |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Centre for Economic and Financial Research at the New Economic School (CEFIR at NES) Nakhimovsky prospect, 47, Office 720, Moscow, Russia;2. National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Myasnitskaya str. 20, Moscow, Russia;1. Department of Physics, Periyar University, Salem- 636 011, Tamilnadu, India;2. The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy;3. Department of Chemistry, Periyar University, Salem- 636 011, Tamilnadu, India;4. Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology, Periyar University, Salem- 636 011, Tamilnadu, India;1. Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, United Kingdom;2. CERDI, University of Auvergne, France;3. Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University, Czech Republic;4. CESifo Munich, Germany;1. University of Hamburg, Germany;2. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Rothenbaumchaussee 32, 20148 Hamburg, Germany;3. Radboud University Nijmegen, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands;1. Interfaculty Initiative in the Social Sciences, Kobe University, 2-1, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku, Kobe, 657-8501, Japan;2. Department of Urban and Environmental Engineering, School of Engineering, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka, 819-0395, Japan;3. Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1-3-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 100-8901, Japan;4. School of Economics and Finance, QUT Business School, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia;1. University of Witten/Herdecke, Faculty of Management and Economics, Alfred-Herrhausen-Straße 50, 58488 Witten, Germany;2. Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Berlin, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role of managerial ownership and incentive payment as potential drivers of innovation decisions by firms and as shifters of the competition-innovation link in the Russian manufacturing industry, where poorly protected property rights and a path-dependent market structure (typical for many transition economies) lead to a variety of outcomes. We use recent survey-based microdata for nearly 2000 non-listed companies in Russia. Our results suggest that managerial ownership, which initially evolved as a means of protecting against and resisting dysfunctional institutions, may stimulate decisions to undertake R&D and risky product innovations. Further, managerial ownership and competition are complementary motivations for R&D and innovation. Incentive payment to hired managers is a positive commitment instrument but has no impact on the competition-innovation link. |
| |
| Keywords: | Agency costs Managerial ownership Incentive contract Competition Innovation |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
