Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility |
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Institution: | 1. Geology Department, Faculty of Science, Ain Shams University, 11566 Cairo, Egypt;2. Geology Department, Faculty of Science, Al-Azhar University, Nasr City, 11884 Cairo, Egypt |
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Abstract: | In the Passing the Buck game, the n members of a group decide in a given order whether or not to incur costs so that they can fix a certain problem for the benefit of the group. Passing the Buck means that one relies on the service of a successor. The decision is influenced by social preferences and by strategic considerations. We derive three main conclusions from experiments with n=3 and n=4. (i) The unique perfect Baysian equilibrium of the Passing the Buck game with incomplete information about the preferences of other players generally fits the data, however with two interesting exceptions. (ii) Backward induction breaks down if it requires more than two steps, i.e., for the first player in the game with n=4. (iii) Making one of the members of the group an “expert” who alone is competent to fix the problem is connected with a change of social preferences. |
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Keywords: | Public goods Volunteer?s Dilemma Responsibility |
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