Price discrimination and efficient matching |
| |
Authors: | Ettore Damiano Hao Li |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George Street, M5S 3G7 Toronto, Ontario, Canada |
| |
Abstract: | This paper considers the problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort different types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive meeting places, where agents randomly form pairwise matches. We make the standard assumption that the match value function exhibits complementarities, so that matching types at equal percentiles maximizes total match value and is efficient. We provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for the revenue-maximizing sorting to be efficient. These conditions require the match value function, modified to incorporate the incentive cost of eliciting private type information, to exhibit complementarities in types.JEL Clalssification Numbers C7, D4We thank Jonathan Levin, Tracy Lewis, and the seminar audience at University of California at Los Angeles, University of British Columbia, Duke University, and 2003 Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for helpful suggestions from the referees and the Editor |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|