| 国有企业隐性激励"双重缺位"问题探析 |
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| 引用本文： | 黄再胜.国有企业隐性激励"双重缺位"问题探析[J].经济经纬,2003(6):88-91. |
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| 作者姓名： | 黄再胜 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京政治学院,上海分院,上海,200433 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业隐性激励是由外部市场竞争性激励和企业内部劳动市场隐含契约性激励共同组成的。转轨时期国有企业由于所处的外部市场竞争不充分和企业内部劳动市场的扭曲。因而存在企业隐性激励机制“双重缺位”现象。国有企业内外部隐性激励机制“双重缺位”是导致国有企业经理人员行为短期化根本原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 隐性激励 双重缺位 经理行为 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-1096(2003)06-0088-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2003年6月23日 |
A Study on the "Recessive Motivator Absent" Problem for SOEs Management |
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| HUANG Zai-sheng.A Study on the "Recessive Motivator Absent" Problem for SOEs Management[J].Economic Survey,2003(6):88-91. |
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| Authors: | HUANG Zai-sheng |
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| Abstract: | The recessive motivation consists of internal and external motivators. During the transition period, the managers of state -
owned enterprises (SOEs) always do activities with short-eyesight. The reason for this comes from the absence of recessive motivators, which is the due result of imperfect human capital market. |
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| Keywords: | recessive motivation motivator absent manager's behavior |
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