An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments |
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Authors: | Bezalel Peleg |
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Affiliation: | The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel |
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Abstract: | Let M be a set of m players, m≧3, and let Γ be the set of all (finite) games (without side payments) that have a non-empty core. When M is finite, the following four (independent) axioms fully characterize the core on Γ: (i) non-emptiness, (ii) individual rationality, (iii) the reduced game property, and (iv) the converse reduced game property. If M is infinite, then the converse reduced game property is redundant. |
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