| 出口退税管理的不对称信息分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 屠庆忠,郭辉明. 出口退税管理的不对称信息分析[J]. 税务与经济, 2004, 0(5): 45-49 |
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| 作者姓名： | 屠庆忠 郭辉明 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国农业大学,经管学院,北京,100094
2. 阿克苏地区地方税务局,新疆,阿克苏,843000 |
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| 摘 要： | 在出口退税管理过程中存在着两类委托代理关系:税务机关与外贸企业之间的委托代理关系及中央政府与税务机关之间的委托代理关系。由于不对称信息现象的存在使得出口退税管理难以达到优化状态。运用信息经济学的方法,通过对出口退税管理的行为主体间的委托代理关系分析,可以找到均衡条件下影响代理人最优努力水平的各项因素,从激励约束机制设计角度探讨如何改进现行出口退税管理,使其更好地发挥应有的作用。
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| 关 键 词： | 出口退税 委托代理 激励约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-9339(2004)05-0045-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-02-19 |
Asymmetric Information Analysis on the Management of Export Rebate |
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| TU Qing-zhong,GUO Hui-ming. Asymmetric Information Analysis on the Management of Export Rebate[J]. Taxation and Economy, 2004, 0(5): 45-49 |
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| Authors: | TU Qing-zhong GUO Hui-ming |
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| Affiliation: | TU Qing-zhong~1,GUO Hui-ming~2 |
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| Abstract: | There are two kinds of relationship of agency by agreement during the course of the management of export rebate:the agency by agreement between tax authorities and foreign-trade enterprises,the agency by agreement between central government and tax authorities.Due to the asymmetric information phenomenon,the management of export rebate cannot be optimized.The author tries using the methods of information economy,finds the influencing factors of the optimal effort level of the agent through analyzing the relationship of agency by agreement between the entities who participates in the management of export rebat.And then discusses how to improve the existing management of export rebate through the design of the stimulation and restriction system and exerts its better effect. |
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| Keywords: | export rebate agency by agreement stimulation and restriction system |
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