Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly? |
| |
Authors: | Kazuhiko Kato |
| |
Institution: | (1) Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan |
| |
Abstract: | We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where
public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits
are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater
(resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the
degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large). |
| |
Keywords: | oligopoly mixed market tradable emission permits |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|