| 农村金融监管的演化博弈模型分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张前程,王明成. 农村金融监管的演化博弈模型分析[J]. 安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2010, 27(5): 3-5. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2010.05.001 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张前程 王明成 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽财经大学,国际经济贸易学院,安徽,蚌埠,233030;南京大学,经济学院,江苏,南京,210093 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目，安徽省高校省级自然科学基金重点项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 监管部门和农村金融机构群体构成博弈的参与方,在各自利益的驱使下,二者通过渐进学习和调整形成演化稳定策略。基于演化结果的稳定性、趋势性和影响因素,针对农村金融监管的现状,必须健全农村金融市场体系,加大农村金融机构违规的惩罚力度,提升农村金融监管的技术水平,强化监管部门的奖励强度和惩罚力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 农村金融 监管 演化博弈 模型 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Rural Financial Supervision |
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| ZHANG Qian-cheng,WANG Ming-cheng. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Rural Financial Supervision[J]. , 2010, 27(5): 3-5. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1671-9247.2010.05.001 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Qian-cheng WANG Ming-cheng |
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| Abstract: | Supervision department and rural financial organizations constitute two sides of the game.Because they are prompted by their individual benefit,the game forms evolutionary stable strategy through gradual learning and adjustment.Based on the stability,tendency and influential factors of the evolutionary results,we should perfect rural financial market system,strengthen the punishment of financial violation of law,promote rural financial supervision level,and stress the incentive mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | rural finance supervision evolutionary game model |
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