Labour contracts in a stock market economy |
| |
Authors: | Michael Peters |
| |
Affiliation: | Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, Toronto M5S 1A1, Canada |
| |
Abstract: | In this paper, labour contracts are examined in the context of a general stock market economy where all shareholders are risk averse, and firms act in shareholders interest. The problem considered is whether some firm can offer a wage contract that will make all its shareholders better off. We show by example that, contrary to the arguments in the partial equilibrium framework, it is possible that no such contract will exist, even when there are potential gains to risk sharing. A sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible pareto improving contract is given. It is shown that contract trading will arise provided some firm has no large shareholders. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|