Managerial ownership,board structure,and the division of gains in divestitures |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Pathology, Tianjin Medical University General Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;2. Department of Nuclear Medicine, Tianjin Medical University General Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;3. Department of Pathology, Tianjin First Center Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;4. Department of General Surgery, Tianjin Medical University General Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;5. Tianjin Key Laboratory of Lung Cancer Metastasis and Tumor Microenviroment, Tianjin Lung Cancer Institute, Tianjin Medical University General Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;6. Department of Endocrinology, Tianjin Medical University General Hospital, Tianjin, PR China;7. Department of Nuclear Medicine, Second Affiliated Hospital of Zhejiang Medical University, Hangzhou, PR China;1. University of L''Aquila, Department of Industrial and Information Engineering and Economics, Via Gronchi 18, 67100 L''Aquila, Italy;2. Polytechnic University of Milan, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Via Lambruschini 4/b, 20156 Milan, Italy;1. National Central University, Taiwan, ROC;2. National University of Singapore, Singapore |
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| Abstract: | This study shows that shareholders of a firm that divests assets receive gains that are significantly related to stock ownership by the firm's managers and to the proportion of outside directors on the firm's board when the divestiture produces positive total dollar gains. Our results agree with the notions that higher levels of ownership give managers the incentive to sell assets that create negative synergies, the incentive to negotiate the best price for shareholders, and that outside directors fulfill their responsibilities as effective monitors and advisors to management. |
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