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Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects |
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| Authors: | Gian Luigi Albano Fabrizio Germano Stefano Lovo |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Economics and ELSE, University College London, WC1E 6BT London, UK;(2) Departament d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005 Barcelona, Spain;(3) HEC, Finance and Economics Department, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France |
| Abstract: | We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object. |
| Keywords: | Ascending auctions for multiple objects Clock auctions FCC auctions Collusion Retaliation |
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