基于委托代理理论的国有企业公开招聘经理人的相关问题探讨

公开招聘国有企业的经理人和对于这些经理人的激励与约束问题，在我国才刚刚开始研究。文章分析了公开招聘的经理人对于国企发展的正、负面效应，选择委托代理模型来研究公开招聘经理人问题。文章认为影响国有企业收益和经理人努力程度的因素包括单位努力成本、产出系数、市场波动程度、经理人风险偏好程度；公开招聘的经理人的业绩提成比例应该高于原管理层；公开招聘中应重视风险偏好度高的经理人，同时要加强对他们的监督约束。

On the Issues of Managers Recruited from Public in State-Owned Enterprises Based on the Principal-Agent Incentive Model

Researches on the policy of recruiting managers from public and the design of incentive-compatibility and constraint mechanism in state-owned enterprises has just begun in China. This paper firstly analyzes the positive and negative effects of this kind of managers to the state-owned enterprises, and then uses principal-agent incentive model as a tool to research some related issues and at last summarizes some suggestions. There are three suggestions: firstly, the factors that affect the income of enterpris...