Pricing and coordination with consideration of piracy for digital goods in supply chains |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Industrial and Information Management, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan;2. Department of International Business and Trade, Shu-Te University, Taiwan;1. Silberman College of Business, Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1000 River Rd. Teaneck, NJ 07666, USA;2. Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, MS 2101, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA;3. Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, 130 Brooks Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA;1. University of Hamburg, Institute for Marketing, Welckerstr. 8, 20354 Hamburg, Germany;2. Department of Marketing, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands;3. University of Hamburg, Institute for Marketing, Research Center for Media and Communication, Welckerstr. 8, 20354 Hamburg, Germany;4. University of Hamburg, Institute for Marketing, Graduate School for Media and Communication, Welckerstr. 8, 20354 Hamburg, Germany;1. University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics, Varnbüelstrasse 19, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland;2. University of Mannheim, Department of Business Administration, L5, 2, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany;3. London Business School, Regent''s Park, London, NW1 4SA, United Kingdom;4. Columbia Business School, Uris Hall, 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, United States;1. FAME/GRAPE, Poland;2. University of Warsaw, Poland;3. IZA, Germany |
| |
| Abstract: | Sales of digital goods via traditional channels are affected by those on digital channels, and thus a competitive relationship often exists. In addition, due to the ease of piracy, digital goods may suffer from a fall in demand, which intensifies competition. This study considers a single supplier who sells digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through two independent and different retail channels, such as traditional and digital ones, which may compete with each other in terms of service and price. To consider the effects of piracy on demand, a Stackelberg game is utilized to determine the optimal gain-sharing ratio and the equilibrium prices for all channel members with an aim to maximize the profit of the entire supply chain. It is found that an increase in piracy would force retailers to compete in a smaller market, and thus lead to a decrease in profits for each channel member. Therefore, a retailer who has a greater market share and is capable of managing a lower piracy rate would gain more profits by setting a higher price. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
