An integrative framework of cooperative advertising: Should manufacturers continuously support retailer advertising? |
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| Institution: | 1. IMUVA, Universidad de Valladolid, Spain;2. Faculty of Business, Athabasca University, Canada;1. Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Built Environment, Birmingham City University, Birmingham B5 5JU, UK;2. School of Civil and Mechanical Engineering, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia;3. Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University, Birmingham B5 5JU, UK;1. Research Institute for International Management (FIM-HSG), University of St. Gallen (HSG), Dufourstrasse 40a, 9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland;2. Siemens Management Consulting (SMC), Beijing, China;3. Indian Institute of Management Udaipur, MLSU Campus, Udaipur, Rajasthan 313001, India;4. Department of Supply Chain Management, Friedrich-Alexander-University, Erlangen, Germany, Lange Gasse 20, Sekretariat Zi. 4.428, D-90403 Nürnberg, Germany;1. Yonsei Business Research Institute, Yonsei University, School of Business, Seoul, Korea;2. IE University, Spain;3. Yonsei University, School of Business, Seoul, Korea;4. University of California, Berkeley, Department of Statistics, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA;1. VCU School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA;2. Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA;3. College of Business Administration, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX 79968, USA |
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| Abstract: | A two-period game is developed in a bilateral monopoly where, besides pricing decisions, the retailer and manufacturer can set their advertising and cooperative advertising support rates for each period. It is demonstrated that, in addition to the established continuous cooperative advertising programs, in which the retailer advertises and the manufacturer supports retailer advertising in each period, two other advertising schedules are possible. First, the retailer advertises in each period, while the manufacturer only supports the second-period advertising. Second, whether or not the manufacturer provides a cooperative advertising program in the first period, the retailer only advertises in the second period and receives advertising support. The conditions under which each of these advertising arrangements is implemented are identified. In a continuous cooperative advertising schedule, the manufacturer may change his advertising support over time depending on the nature of the long-term effects of retailer advertising. The implications of these findings are discussed. |
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