Incremental approaches to establishing trust |
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Authors: | Robert Kurzban Mary L Rigdon Bart J Wilson |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut St., Philadelphia, USA;(2) Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., 48106 Ann Arbor, USA;(3) Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, 22030 Fairfax, USA |
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Abstract: | We investigate cooperation using an incremental investment game in which the first-mover has the ability to make small, but
increasing incremental investments in their counterpart. Our experiment is designed to test whether establishing trust in
small increments is more effective than alternatives, including a one-shot investment game, a decrease only condition where
the amount the first-mover sends to the second-mover must be less than the amount previously sent, and an unrestricted condition
where the first-mover is not restricted by the amount previously sent. Although results were mixed, broadly, iteration affords
greater cooperation than one-shot games and, when given the choice, participants seem to prefer to build trust gradually.
Implications for institutional design are discussed.
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Keywords: | Investment game Trust Reciprocity Bargaining Cooperation Experimental economics |
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