Value-added tax options for India |
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Authors: | Robin Burgess Stephen Howes Nicholas Stern |
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Affiliation: | (1) Suntory Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics, Oxford University, UK;(2) World Bank, 1818 H St. NW, 20433 Washington, DC;(3) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UK |
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Abstract: | The pressures of aggregate revenue, the requirement of a reduced role for customs duties for the liberalization of the economy, and the complexity and strains of the current system together point clearly toward the desirability of tax reform in India. Since domestic indirect taxes provide the major source of revenue, they deserve special attention. This paper argues that India would benefit from moving toward a system of value-added taxation (VAT) and focuses on the way in which a VAT (or VATs) can be best introduced into India given the country's federal structure. Three different options are distinguished: a central VAT, dual VAT, and states' VAT. We argue that the first is politically infeasible, that the second represents the best way forward in the short term, and that the third deserves consideration as a long-run option. Special attention is paid to the problems that would arise under either a states' or a dual VAT with regard to taxing interstate trade. |
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Keywords: | value-added tax indirect taxation fiscal federalism India |
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