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Portfolio Performance Manipulation and Manipulation-proof Performance Measures
Authors:Goetzmann, William   Ingersoll, Jonathan   Spiegel, Matthew   Welch, Ivo
Affiliation:Yale School of Management, PO Box 208200, New Haven, CT 06520-8200
Abstract:Numerous measures have been proposed to gauge the performanceof active management. Unfortunately, these measures can be gamed.Our article shows that gaming can have a substantial impacton popular measures even in the presence of high transactionscosts. Our article shows there are conditions under which amanipulation-proof measure exists and fully characterizes it.This measure looks like the average of a power utility function,calculated over the return history. The case for using our alternativeranking metric is particularly compelling for hedge funds whoseuse of derivatives is unconstrained and whose managers' compensationitself induces a nonlinear payoff.
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