| 企业配股申请与政府门槛监管措施的动态博弈均衡 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐军辉,.企业配股申请与政府门槛监管措施的动态博弈均衡[J].华东经济管理,2008,22(4):123-125. |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐军辉 |
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| 作者单位： | 广州大学,公共管理学院,广东,广州,510405 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章运用信息博弈动态均衡模型,对企业的配股申请与政府监管的关系进行了分析,结果表明过于严格的监管会造成企业虚假披露愈演愈烈,而政府监管机构不断提高监管水平,企业也不断提高造假水平,监管机构的高门槛措施无法有效分离投资型企业和投机型企业,除非监管机构能够增加信息包装的成本,使得投资型企业在发送投资型信号时最有利,而投机型企业发送投机型信号时能使自身利益最大化,从而实现两者的分离.
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| 关 键 词： | 配股申请 政府监管 门槛 动态博弈 信号博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097(2008)04-0123-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2008年1月23日 |
Equilibrium of Dynamic Game between List Companies Application and Government Entry for Rights Issue |
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| XU Jun-hui.Equilibrium of Dynamic Game between List Companies Application and Government Entry for Rights Issue[J].East China Economic Management,2008,22(4):123-125. |
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| Authors: | XU Jun-hui |
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| Institution: | College of Public Management; Guangzhou University; Guangzhou 510405; China |
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| Abstract: | In our paper,dynamic game model is used to analyze the relationship between companies application and government entry for rights issue.We come to the conclusion that high entry is useless for separating good company from bad one,in the contrary,rigorous regulation lead to serious false disclosure,only if cost is added for false disclosure can we separating good one from bad one,that is to say,gamble ones will benefit from sending gambling signal while investment ones will benefit from investing signal. |
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| Keywords: | application for rights issue government regulation entry dynamic game signaling game |
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