| 订单农业违约风险的博弈分析与对策研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 赵俊英.订单农业违约风险的博弈分析与对策研究[J].贵州财经学院学报,2006(1):56-59. |
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| 作者姓名： | 赵俊英 |
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| 作者单位： | 郑州航空工业管理学院,河南,郑州,450015 |
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| 摘 要： | 订单农业对于推进农业产业化进程、增加农民收入具有重要作用.然而订单农业的违约问题制约着其作用的进一步发挥.基于订单农业的违约风险博弈模型分析表明,防范违约风险应利用金融创新工具建立风险分担机制,强化诚信理念,提高农户和企业的信用度,加强合同的系统管理.
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| 关 键 词： | 订单农业 违约风险 博弈 对策 |
| 文章编号： | 1003-6636（2006）01-0056-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-10-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年10月5日 |
A Game-theory Analysis of and Countermeasures for Default Risk in Order-based Farming |
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| ZHAO Jun-ying.A Game-theory Analysis of and Countermeasures for Default Risk in Order-based Farming[J].Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,2006(1):56-59. |
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| Authors: | ZHAO Jun-ying |
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| Institution: | Zhengzhou Institute of Aeronautical Industry Management, Zhengzhou, Henan 450015, P.R. China |
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| Abstract: | Order-based farming plays an important role in promoting the industrialization of agriculture and increasing the income of farmers. However, the default problem prevents its effect from being given further play. A game-theory analysis of the default risk indicates that, to guard against the risk, it is necessary to establish risk-sharing mechanism through financial innovations, consolidate the conception of good faith, improve the creditworthiness of farmers and firms and strengthen the systematic management of contracts. |
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| Keywords: | order-based farming default risk game strategy |
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