考得好不如报得好么？——高考志愿填报博弈研究

本文把考后知分志愿填报的过程看作是考生博弈过程，分析了考生的均衡策略。均衡策略依赖学校的热门程度、学校的招生名额和考生被学校录取时的效用。除了分数最高的考生，其他考生间的策略是互相依赖的，这个博弈有可能出现多重均衡，并且均衡结果也可能是无效率的。本文的分析表明，在填报志愿时，考得好有时不如报得好。

Strategy Analysis during College Admission

The process of submitting college ranking list during college admission is like a revealing preference game with incomplete information. The equilibrium of the game is determined by the desirability of schools, the quota of schools and the utility of colleges. Except for the student with the highest score, other students' strategies are correlated. There are multiple equilibria and mixed strategy equilibrium. And the equilibrium of game sometimes is inefficient. It partly explains why it is so hard to submit the college ranking list in practice.