Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics |
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Authors: | Rajiv Sethi |
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Affiliation: | Department of Economics, Barnard College, Columbia University, 3009 Broadway, New York, New York, 10027 |
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Abstract: | The replicator dynamics are generalized to allow for strategy-specific barriers to learning. The resulting dynamics satisfy neither payoff monotonicity nor payoff positivity, but do satisfy weak payoff positivity. It is shown that initial states from which trajectories converge to a rest point under the replicator dynamics may yield trajectories which approach a stable limit cycle under the generalized replicator dynamics. Furthermore, strategies which are strictly dominated by other pure strategies may survive indefinitely along such nonconvergent paths.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73. |
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