Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector |
| |
Authors: | Stephen Littlechild |
| |
Institution: | (1) Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK |
| |
Abstract: | Ohio allows communities to vote to aggregate the loads of individual consumers (unless they opt out) in order to seek a competitive
energy supplier. Over 200 communities have voted to do this for electricity. By 2004 residential switching reached 69% in
Cleveland territory (95% from municipal aggregation) but by 2006 had fallen to 8%. Savings are now small, but customer acquisition
costs are low and the cost to consumers is negligible. Aggregation and retail competition have been thwarted by Rate Stabilization
Plans holding incumbent utility prices below cost since 2006. In the Ohio gas sector, rate regulation has not discouraged
aggregation and competition, but market prices falling below municipally negotiated rates can be politically embarrassing.
Municipal aggregation thus works when conditions allow it, and enhances competition. How it would fare against individual
choice in a market conducive to retail competition remains an open question.
|
| |
Keywords: | Municipal aggregation Retail competition Electricity Gas Ohio Regulation |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|