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Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector
Authors:Stephen Littlechild
Institution:(1) Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG, UK
Abstract:Ohio allows communities to vote to aggregate the loads of individual consumers (unless they opt out) in order to seek a competitive energy supplier. Over 200 communities have voted to do this for electricity. By 2004 residential switching reached 69% in Cleveland territory (95% from municipal aggregation) but by 2006 had fallen to 8%. Savings are now small, but customer acquisition costs are low and the cost to consumers is negligible. Aggregation and retail competition have been thwarted by Rate Stabilization Plans holding incumbent utility prices below cost since 2006. In the Ohio gas sector, rate regulation has not discouraged aggregation and competition, but market prices falling below municipally negotiated rates can be politically embarrassing. Municipal aggregation thus works when conditions allow it, and enhances competition. How it would fare against individual choice in a market conducive to retail competition remains an open question.
Keywords:Municipal aggregation  Retail competition  Electricity  Gas  Ohio  Regulation
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