论国企改革中的不可信威胁、监督制衡与路径选择

虽然大多数国有企业都进行了公司制改造,但是效益并没有得到明显的改善.一方面,所有公司治理机制的有效性最终都取决于在市场竞争中失败成为一个可信威胁,而对于许多国有企业来说,在政府"父爱"的关怀下,这种威胁是不可信的,这使得国有企业经营者没有压力进行创新,得过且过,效益低下是自然的结果.另一方面,国有企业的投资者、债权人只有弱的动力去监督国有企业,国有企业也并没有建立起内部的制衡机制,这使得国有企业的"内部人控制"现象仍很突出,经营者可以"任我行".我们认为国有企业低效与其独特的产权制度密不可分,国有资产分步骤、有条理、有规则地退出竞争性领域,这是改革的关键.引进机构投资者,加强市场监督,加大剩余索取权在企业从业人员中的分享程度也是促进国有企业公司制改革,提高国有企业运营效率必不可少的环节.

Incredible Menace,Supervision and Route Choice of State-owned Enterprise Reformation

The benefit of State-owned Enterprise isn't increased evidently though most of state-owned enterprises have altered to company. On the one side, all company control mechanism lies on a credible menace that company may fail in market competition. But to many state-owned enterprise .government always helps them too much, the menace is incredible. The state-owned enterprise hasn't pressure to innovate, muddle along , so low benefit is a certain result. On the other side , the investor and creditor have only infirmness impetus to supervise state-owned enterprise while the diversion mechanism isn't constructed too. The interior control is prominently. We think that low benefit of state-owned enterprise is related to state-owned property right. The most important step is that state-owned asset must retreat from competition domain. Introducing institution investor , reinforcing market supervision , increasing salary are also important.